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ABTRACT 
This study employs digital methods in conjunction with traditional content and discourse 
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and how, if at all, diplomatic entities around the world engage in diplomatic exchanges 
with him. The results confirm speculations that Trump’s diplomatic communication on 
Twitter disrupts traditional codes of diplomatic language but show little evidence that 
new codes of diplomatic interactions on social media are being constructed, given that 
other diplomatic entities around the world mostly remain within the confines of 
traditional notions of diplomacy in (not) communicating with Trump on Twitter. 
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The US President Donald Trump’s naming and shaming of several world leaders and 
countries on Twitter as soon as he took office in January 2017 received considerable media 
attention (Apps 2016; Crowley, McCaskill, and Nelson 2017; Dejevsky 2017; Huang 2017; 
Tremonti 2016), with a wide range of commentators expressing concern over newly elected 
president’s diplomatic practices on social media. Commenting on Trump’s “Twitter 
diplomacy,” Dejevsky (2017, n.p.) claims that Trump “has earned almost universal 
disapproval from the political and especially the diplomatic establishments, which regard 
such heedless commentary as, first, ill-advised in the extreme and, second, plain crass.” 
Indeed, his diplomatic practices on Twitter have been criticised by political actors at home 
(Crowley, McCaskill, and Nelson 2017) and abroad (Huang 2017). Most notably, China 
reacted to Trump’s negative comments on Twitter in an article published by the Chinese state 
news agency Xinhua titled “Addiction to Twitter diplomacy is unwise,” in which it 
emphasised that tweeting is not a suitable way for conducting diplomacy (Huang 2017). 
According to Tremonti (2016), with Trump’s Twitter practices, diplomacy is “entering an 
unprecedented, unpredictable, and extremely high-stakes era” (n.p.; see also Apps 2016).  
While these are valuable observations, Trump’s diplomatic practices on social media 
have not been systematically studied; hence many assessments are based on anecdotal 
evidence. Consequently, to what extent is Trump using social media for diplomatic purposes, 
how is he conducting diplomacy on social media, and who, if at all, is engaging him on social 
media, remains largely speculative. We empirically address these questions in this article and 
also the more fundamental question whether or not Twitter practices are catalysing the 
development of a new code for diplomatic communication on social media. 
The article proceeds as follows.  We first discuss existing literature on diplomacy as 
communication and studies focusing specifically on social media and Trump’s Twitter use. 
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We thereafter describe our methodology, which combines Digital Methods (DM) approach 
with traditional techniques of analysis, such as content analysis and discourse analysis. 
Lastly, we present our findings, analysis, and conclusions. 
 
Diplomacy as communication  
Broadly, diplomacy can be conceptualised as an instrument of policy or a means of 
communication (Sharp 2001). We look at diplomacy as a means of communication. From this 
perspective, language is considered to be the dominant medium of diplomacy (Rana 2001), 
and diplomats’ words are often seen as their actions (Pascual 2001). Also, following Wong 
(2016) and Poguntke and Webb (2005), we consider “diplomats” as not only those who have 
been formally delegated the duties of diplomacy (e.g. foreign ministers, ambassadors), but 
also political leaders who are increasingly important as representatives and negotiators in the 
international arena.  
 
While a comprehensive overview of main characteristics of diplomatic language is 
lacking in the literature, scholars have emphasized following characteristics of diplomatic 
language:  
 
1. Diplomatic language should be courteous, marked by respect for and 
consideration of others (Jönsson and Hall 2005). In effect, there is no space 
for insults, uncivil wording, naming, and shaming. 
 
2. Diplomatic language should be constructive and positive. Diplomats in 
their communication should be careful not to appear superior, indifferent, 
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controlling or offensive towards other actors in international relations 
(Jönsson and Hall 2005; Park and Lim 2014; Strauss, Kruikemeier, 
Meulen, and Noort 2015).  
 
3. Diplomatic communication should be balanced and moderate.  It should not 
be dramatic, especially in high stake situations (Nick 2001). 
 
4. Diplomatic language should be ambiguous. It is often indirect and uses 
hedges, which makes it appear vague and open to interpretations. Such 
ambiguity serves several purposes in diplomacy, e.g. retaining flexibility in 
negotiations, making claims deniable, and being able to speak to multiple 
audiences (Jönsson and Hall 2005).  
 
These characteristics are considered part of the diplomatic code, which guides interactions 
between diplomats. Given the importance and delicateness of interactions between diplomats, 
great deal of thought goes into crafting diplomatic language. According to Pascual (2001), 
diplomatic communications need to be “deliberate, masterful, carefully and prudently drawn 
up” (230-31). 
While the ways in which diplomats communicate and engage in dialogue with other 
actors is considered crucial in diplomacy, scholars and practitioners alike emphasize that 
what is said in diplomatic communication is as important as what is left unsaid (Jönsson and 
Hall 2005; Pascual 2001). In other words, omission of information in a diplomatic dialogue is 
an action in itself, which sends messages to other actors in the same way as information that 
has been communicated. The same can be said for a lack of response and engagement in a 
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dialogue. In other words, if one party in a diplomatic relation does not engage in a dialogue 
initiated by another party, this lack of response is interpreted as deliberate and strategic, and 
an action in itself. Hence, in diplomatic communication, both behaviour and non-behaviour 
are seen to constitute messages. 
 
Social media diplomacy 
Writing at the beginning of the 2010s, Stein (2011, 114) declared: “all governments are 
facing an urgent need, partly driven by the emergence of new technologies and social media, 
to update their diplomatic instruments.” Several years later, Twitter positioned itself as the 
“ultimate channel for digital diplomacy for world leaders and governments.” Reportedly 
almost 180 world leaders and governments are using it for communicating with their peers 
and publics (Lüfkens 2017).  
Existing research on the use of social media in diplomacy has mostly focused on how 
social media is used for public diplomacy (i.e., relationships between nation-states and 
foreign publics), and on the practices of diplomatic institutions such as ministries for foreign 
affairs and embassies (Bjola and Holmes 2015; Cassidy and Manor 2016; Cull 2011; Zhong 
and Lu 2013; Strauss et al. 2015). Here social media is often seen as allowing for the 
development of a more open and collaborative model of diplomacy.  Correspondingly, it is 
often said that social media requires diplomats to engage in a more personalised and 
interactive way with their audiences.  However, there is debate on both the extent of 
influence of social media on diplomatic communication and the extent of influence that the 
social media is having on developments in diplomatic practice (Bjola and Holmes 2015; 
Hocking and Mellisen 2015; Zhong and Lu 2013). In fact, there is research showing that 
diplomatic entities on social media rarely meet expectations of social media diplomacy, i.e., 
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they tend not to focus on interaction, networking, and openness (Cassidy and Manor 2016; 
Strauss et al. 2015).  
Overall, existing research in social media diplomacy has two important limitations. 
First, it overly focuses on public diplomacy, almost completely ignoring government-to-
government social media diplomacy (G-2-G). A rare exception is Cassidy and Manor (2016), 
which debunks social media diplomacy myths, but even here, G-2-G is barely discussed. 
Second, while questions concerning agenda setting, reach, and engagement have been 
generally explored, the issue of style as a possible source of influence on diplomatic 
communication has been neglected. 
Consequently, existing studies provide a glimpse into the effective strategies that 
diplomatic institutions can use in conducting public diplomacy over social media, but there is 
hardly anything known about how world leaders use social media to engage with their 
diplomatic counterparts. According to Lüfkens (2017), world leaders extensively use social 
media for various purposes, including fostering relationships with other world leaders and 
foreign publics. According to many indicators, the most popular social network world leaders 
use is Twitter. Data from 2018 shows that the US President Donald Trump is the most-
followed world leader on Twitter, with Pope Francis close behind. Trump is also considered 
to be the most influential world leader on Twitter based on number of interactions with 
followers, and the second most effective leader on Twitter based on number of retweets per 
tweet. In May of 2017 Trump’s followers on Twitter included 137 world leaders (Lüfkens 
2017).  
 
Trump’s social media communication 
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There is a growing body of research looking into Trump’s social media communication style. 
Existing research, which primarily examines his social media communication in primaries 
and 2016 US presidential elections, suggests Trump’s social media communication has 
following characteristics:   
 
1. Trump’s social media communication tends to be simple. The analysis of more than 
2000 tweets Trump posted in 2015 and 2016 shows that his language on Twitter is 
characterised by frequent use of monosyllabic words (Crockett 2016; Ott 2017).  
2. Trump’s communication tends to be personalised and grandiose. Trump has been 
found to often use the first person and informal language, commonly using personal 
pronouns such as I, me, mine, myself, and frequently using social media to boast 
about himself (Ahmadian, Azarshahi, and Paulhus 2017; Merrill 2015; Shafer 2015).  
3. Trump's social media communication during primaries and presidential campaign 
tended to be characterised by negativity (Gross and Johnson 2016). His tweets were 
often impolite and politically incorrect (Crockett 2016; Enli 2017), with one in four 
tweets attacking someone or something, and one in 10 containing “uncivil wording” 
(Lee and Lim 2017).  
4. Trump’s social media communication during the 2016 campaign tended to be 
emotional and impulsive. He often used capital letters and exclamation marks 
(Crockett 2016); practices which “reinforce the negative sentiment of his Tweets and 
heighten their emotional impact” (Ott 2017, 64). Also, Trump’s tweets are often 
impulsive and lacking “forethought, reflection, or consideration of consequences” 
(Ott 2017, 61).  
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Overall, Trump deviated from practices which have been previously established as effective 
in social media campaigning and utilised a different communication style which Enli (2017, 
54) describes as “more amateurish yet authentic.”  
Shortly after Trump took office, Dejevsky (2017, n.p.) wrote in The Guardian: “There 
was a widespread belief that once Donald Trump was president, his mode of communication 
would change. He would think first, speak later. And if he could not bring himself to do that, 
his wiser aides (or his son-in-law) would ensure that whatever device he used for his 
quickfire utterances was safely locked up.” However, Trump continued with his 
communication style on social media even as he took the position of the president of the 
United States (Apps 2016; Dejevsky 2017).  This has raised concerns, as Trump’s tweets are 
now presidential communications, which can be considered as diplomatic actions of the chief 
diplomat of the United States.  
 
When it comes to Donald Trump’s diplomatic communication on social media, there 
are several permissive and restraining factors that might influence the extent to which it 
follows diplomatic norms.  
On the permissive side, American diplomats are known to be often too direct and 
harsh in diplomatic exchanges (Sharp 2001).  For instance, the US diplomats displayed an 
uncivil and tactless communication style in diplomatic exchanges with both American allies 
and enemies in the period before the Iraq war (Wiseman 2005).  Also, Twitter privileges 
discourse that is simple, impulsive, and uncivil, which seems the complete opposite of the 
language that is said should be used in diplomatic interactions (Ott 2016).  On the restraining 
side, the need for cooperation from other countries creates pressure to follow the universally 
expected diplomatic codes of behaviour in international relations. In the case of the Iraq war, 
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when the US realised it needed international support for its actions, it changed tack and 
reverted to the diplomatic code of behaviour (Wiseman 2005). 
If Trump’s diplomatic communications on social media are indeed consistently at 
odds with traditional conventions of diplomatic language, there are two possibilities. One, his 
style of social media diplomacy might disrupt traditional diplomatic practices and potentially 
cause conflicts in international relations. Two, it may lead to the construction of new 
conventions in (digital) diplomacy. This could take a form of “gradual change and adaptation 
within the existing frameworks and principles,” or it could represent “a fundamental break 
with accepted patterns of behaviour, norms and rules so that diplomacy starts to look 
fundamentally different” (Hocking and Mellisen 2015, 21). 
 
Methodology 
We combine Digital Methods (DM) approach (Caliandro and Gandini 2017; Rogers 2013) 
with traditional techniques of analysis, such as content analysis (Krippendorff 2012) and 
discourse analysis (Johnston 2008). 
Specifically, we follow the approach proposed by Lewis, Zamith, and Hermida 
(2013), who fruitfully combine DM and traditional techniques for analysis of social media 
texts. In their seminal article entitled “Content analysis in an era of big data,” they urge 
researchers conducting content and/or discourse analysis of Twitter messages to use a hybrid 
approach blending “computational and manual methods throughout the content analysis 
process.” (39)  
We use DM for managing as well as mapping the social and semantic structure of our 
dataset (119,229 tweets), i.e., for: (a) sampling the database, (b) extracting Twitter users of 
interest (e.g. Twitter users mentioned by Trump), and (c) tracking the interactions among 
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users (e.g. reciprocal mentioning) (Marres 2015). Subsequently, we conduct a traditional 
content and discourse analysis of Trump’s Tweets.  
 
Data collection 
We gathered the tweets posted by the Donald Trump’s official Twitter account 
(@realDonaldTrump) by using custom-built software – a Python script programmed for 
interrogating the Twitter REST API1 (Russell 2013). Specifically, we implemented a method 
called “GET statuses/user_timeline.” This method “returns up to 3,200 of a user’s most 
recent Tweets” (Twitter Developer Documentation2). Since we were interested in following 
Trump’s tweets production during his first month of the presidency, we launched the script 
on the 21st of February 2017. Through this procedure, we were able to retrieve 3,247 tweets 
posted by Trump from the March 17, 2016 to the February, 21, 2017, where 192 of them fell 
into our target time period (January 20, 2017 – February 20, 2017). 
Once this subset was extracted from the whole dataset, we searched it in order to 
detect the diplomatic entities, world leaders, and foreign countries mentioned by Trump, 
either with or without the mention function (@). After this search, we discovered that Trump 
mentioned diplomatic entities in 34 tweets. Through this procedure, we identified 25 
diplomatic entities mentioned by Trump. For each country mentioned by Trump, we 
identified three diplomatic entities – official country accounts, heads of governments, foreign 
ministers and their offices – that may be in a position to reply to his remarks, focusing on 
those diplomatic entities who have Twitter accounts. Once the list of the official accounts of 
the 41 entities3 was constructed, we again launched our Python script in order to collect all 
the tweets posted by each of the aforementioned accounts. Specifically, the script retrieved 
115,982 tweets, 57 of which contained messages where users engaged in real or imagined 
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conversation with Trump during the first month of his presidency. Therefore, we narrowed 
our analysis to a database composed of 91 tweets (that is, 34 tweets posted by Trump plus 57 
tweets posted by other diplomatic entities)4. We are aware that our analysis focused on a 
small set of data, which limits the generalizability of our results. Nevertheless, given our 
research project is qualitative and exploratory, the statistical generalizability of results was 
not among its primary aims (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Instead, our intention was to explore 
certain cultural processes emerging within a specific digital environment (Caliandro 2018), 
i.e., the fluxes of communication as well as communicative interactions (Larsson and Moe 
2012) generated by Trump and other diplomatic actors on Twitter. Furthermore, we sought to 
obtain a pool of deep qualitative insights useful to establish a solid base to support further 
studies on Trump’s diplomatic strategies on Twitter as well as digital diplomatic 
communication in the age of Trump.      
We submitted the afore-mentioned dataset to two kinds of textual analysis: content 
analysis and discourse analysis. In addition, we took advantage of Gephi, an open-source 
software for social network visualization (Bastian, Heymann, and Jacomy 2009), to make the 
structure of the communicative interactions between Trump and other diplomatic entities 
(e.g. who tweets about whom and with what frequency) visible and thus easier to describe.   
 
Data analysis 
We conducted the content analysis on the dataset composed only of diplomatic tweets posted 
by @realDonaldTrump (34 tweets). We conducted our content analysis using a set of a priori 
coding categories, which were inspired by the existing literature on diplomatic language 
(Nick 2001; Jönsson and Hall 2005; Park and Lim 2014; Strauss et al. 2015). The categories 
we used are as follows: Qualifying, Hedging, Polite, Positive, and Non-dramatic (see Table 2 
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for further details). Our analysis focused more on the intentions of the communicator 
(@realDonaldTrump) (Berelson 1952), rather than on recurrent themes appearing in the units 
of communication (tweets) (Smith 1992). This analysis helps us understand if and to what 
extent Trump embraces or disrupts the traditional diplomatic linguistic code.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Coding book with illustrative tweets 
Coding 
Category 
Description Illustrative tweet 
Qualifying Does the tweet use qualifiers 
which are words or phrases that 
minimize the certainty of a 
statement?  
None found. 
Hedging Does the tweet use hedges which 
are word or phrases that lessen the 
impact of a statement, or express 
uncertainty?  
‘The real story here is why are there so 
many illegal leaks coming out of 
Washington? Will these leaks be 
happening as I deal on N.Koreaetc?’ 
Polite Does the tweet contain polite 
phrases? 
‘Thank you to Prime Minister of 
Australia for telling the truth about our 
very civil conversation that FAKE 
NEWS media lied about. Very nice!’ 
Positive Does the tweet express a positive 
evaluation of a country/leader? 
‘Melania and I are hosting Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Mrs. 
Abe at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, 
Fla. They are a wonderful couple!’ 
Non-
dramatic 
Is the language used in the tweet 
non-dramatic? 
‘Today I will meet with Canadian PM 
Trudeau and a group of leading 
business women to discuss women in 
the workforce.‘ 
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We also analysed his diplomatic tweets by using the lexicalisation technique of 
discourse analysis (Deacon 2007). Examination of Trump’s lexical choices allowed us to 
identify potential ideological beliefs and values that underpin his diplomatic messages 
(Deacon 2007), and uncover their “inherent assumptions and prejudices” (Kogen 2015, 8). In 
doing so, we were guided by the codes of diplomatic language and dialogue identified in the 
relevant literature. On occasion sentence and phrase structure were also analyzed, as they 
reflect speaker’s presentation of action, patterns of ascription, and value judgements (Smith 
and Bell 2007).  
 
We used Gephi mainly for mapping the structure of interactions between Trump and other 
diplomatic entities. In order to do this, we employed some basic network analysis techniques 
(Gruzd, Wellman, and Takhteyev 2011). It was based on both the in-link and out-link 
technique, i.e., we analysed the mentions received and given by each user (Hanneman and 
Riddle 2005). It focused on both direct (e.g. @realDonaldTrump, @AbeShinzo) and indirect 
mentions (e.g. Trump, Abe) among users. 
 
Findings 
Within the first month of his presidency, Donald Trump posted 192 tweets, in which he 
mentioned 6 foreign political leaders and 19 foreign countries. In contrast, in their first month 
in office, British Prime Minister Theresa May posted 16 tweets mentioning one foreign leader 
and one foreign country and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull posted 44 tweets 
mentioning also one foreign leader and one foreign country. This comparison shows how 
extraordinary is Trump’s engagement on Twitter and the extent to which he uses it for 
communicating to and about foreign leaders and countries.  
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Conversations with leaders 
It perhaps is not surprising Trump mentioned six foreign political leaders in his tweets as four 
visited him in the first month of his presidency. He tweeted about three of them – Canadian 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but there was no mention of the first state visit, that of 
Theresa May. While May was mentioned by the official presidential Twitter account, 
@potus, Trump did not mentioned May on his private Twitter account. Similarly, while the 
British media put a major emphasis on May's visit to the US, it was not a lead story on 
American media (Baker-Jordan 2017). Trump not tweeting about May’s visit brings into 
question how special really is the “special” relationship between the US and the UK, at least 
as far as Trump is concerned (see also Wilson 2017). 
 
 
Figure 1. Network analysis of tweets posted by Trump and world leaders he mentions.  Note: The size of the 
nodes indicates the in-degree of users (i.e., the number of mentions received: the bigger the node, the higher the 
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number of mentioned received). The arrows indicate the direction of the relation. The thickness of the lines 
indicates the frequency of the interaction between the nodes they connect (thicker the line connecting two nodes, 
the higher the number of interactions among them).    
 
 
Trump posted only one tweet mentioning Netanyahu during his visit. Netanyahu, on 
the other hand, mentioned Trump in 23 of his tweets in the first month of Trump’s 
presidency, tweeting extensively during his visit to the US. Hence this diplomatic dialogue on 
Twitter was quite one-sided. Given that US-Israeli relationship deteriorated during the 
Obama administration, and that Obama was openly critical of some of Netanyahu’s actions 
(Freedman 2017), his tweets might have been directed at portraying a stronger and better 
relationship with the new US president. On the other hand, Trump’s single tweet could be 
seen as reflecting his reluctance to position himself strongly alongside Israel at that time 
(Freedman 2017).   
While somewhat ignoring May and Netanyahu in his diplomatic communication on 
Twitter, Trump tweeted extensively about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, posting 
seven tweets about him during his three-day visit. Given that Trump has been attacking Japan 
on trade and defence issues throughout his campaign (Smith and McClean 2017), the burst of 
positive tweets about the meeting with Abe suggested a change in his attitude towards Japan. 
Abe reportedly went on a “charm offensive” as soon as Trump was elected in November 
2016 (Nakamura and Fifield 2017), trying to build a “relationship of trust” with the new US 
president and further Japanese interests (Smith and McClean 2017). Trump’s tweets suggest 
that Abe succeeded in developing a constructive and positive relationship with him. It should 
be noted, though, that the Trump-Abe exchange on Twitter was an almost one-way 
diplomatic exchange, as Abe replied to Trump only once – on his departure from the US. Abe 
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rarely uses Twitter and the tweet to Trump was the only one he posted during the examined 
period. Here Abe seems to have made a conscious effort to engage with Trump on Twitter. 
Trudeau, Turnbull, and Putin engaged with Trump on Twitter in a similar manner to 
how Trump engaged with them. The only foreign leader who did not at all interact with 
Trump on Twitter even though he was mention in his tweets is the Chinese President Xi, who 
does not have a Twitter account.  
Overall, it seems that neither Trump disrupted traditional notions of diplomatic 
communication on social media at the beginning of his presidency nor any new conventions 
of diplomatic code were being constructed at the time. 
 
Conversations with countries 
As mentioned earlier, Trump made reference to 19 foreign countries on Twitter in his first 
month of the presidency, a varied mix of America's allies and enemies.  
 
 
Figure 2. List of countries Trump mentions in his tweets presented on a scale “enemy to ally’ according to 
YouGov analysis of who is considered America’s ally, friendly, unfriendly and enemy (Data from Yougov.com, 
2017). Each bar presents a percentage of survey participants who consider a listed country in a particular light. 
Bars do not stack up to 100% as the ‘not sure’ response hasn’t been presented in the figure. Graph should be 
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interpreted as: 1% of Americans consider Canada to be an enemy country, 3% see it as unfriendly, 32% as 
friendly, and 55% consider it an ally.  
 
Analysis of the Twitter interactions between Trump and diplomatic representatives of 
countries he mentions in his tweets reveal several interesting patterns. These Twitter 
interactions could be categorised as follows: friendlies who converse, provoked friendlies 
who converse, provoked friendlies who do not converse, unfriendlies who converse, and 
unfriendlies who do not converse.  
Japan, Canada, and Ukraine fall in the “friendlies who converse” category, as their 
diplomatic representatives engaged with Trump on Twitter, with all sides talking about the 
same or similar issues from a shared perspective.  
Mexico falls in the “provoked friends who converse” category, as its diplomatic 
representatives have engaged extensively with Trump on Twitter on topics of shared interest, 
but they and Trump can be seen as speaking from different perspectives. Mexico initiated the 
dialogue by congratulating Trump on becoming president and talking of a “respectful 
dialogue,” but after several tweets from Trump in which he attacked Mexico, its 
representatives took a more distant stance and did not engage in a confrontation with him. 
 
 
Figure 3. Tweet by Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto posted on January 20, 2017. (Translation: “We will 
establish a respectful dialogue with the government of the President @realDonaldTrump, for the benefit of 
Mexico.”) 
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Figure 4. Tweet by US President Donald Trump posted on January 27, 2017.  
 
 
Countries such as Australia, France, Sweden, and Vietnam fall in the “provoked 
friendlies who do not converse” category. Trump made negative remarks about them on 
Twitter (e.g. Sweden and France are unsafe countries with immigration problems), but 
diplomatic representatives of these countries did not engage in a rebuttal or any discussion on 
the issue raised in Trump’s tweet.  
 
 
Figure 5. Tweet by US President Donald Trump posted on February 3, 2017. 
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Russia, Syria, and Venezuela fall in the “unfriendlies who converse” category. They 
were mentioned in a negative light by Trump and their diplomatic representatives engaged 
him on Twitter. However, each country engaged in a different type of interaction. Russia 
initiated the interaction by congratulating Trump on taking office but restrained from further 
interactions once he started intensely tweeting about it, mostly with negative connotations. 
This might be indicative of its decision not to conduct diplomacy over Twitter. On the other 
hand, Venezuela reacted strongly to Trump’s “command” to release Leopoldo Lopez from 
prison. Venezuela’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Delcy Rodriguez posted a series of tweets 
directly aimed at Trump via @ function in which she attacked him for what she considered 
was interference in Venezuelan affairs. Obviously, Venezuela was comfortable with engaging 
in these diplomatic interactions on Twitter and deliberately used tweets as vehicles of 
diplomatic exchanges.  
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Figure 6. Tweet by US President Donald Trump posted on February 15, 2017. 
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Figure 7. Tweet by Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs Delcy Rodríguez posted on February 15, 2017. 
(Translation: “The Bolivarian Republic [of] Venezuela rejects the intrusion and aggression of [US President] 
@realDonaldTrump [who intends] to give orders to our homeland.”) 
 
Syria has initiated the dialogue with Trump by posting two tweets (one of them was in 
Arabic) in which it quoted its President Bashar al-Assad “agreeing” with Trump on the fight 
against terrorism. Trump then posted a tweet naming Syria as a country from where refugees 
were coming into the US during “COURT BREAKDOWN” with regard to his travel ban. 
Syria replied with a tweet in English in which it appeared to change tactics by “asking” 
Trump to “stop supporting the terrorists,” insinuating that the US President is on the side of 
terrorists. In another tweet posted on the Syrian Presidency account in Arabic, al-Assad is 
quoted as saying that the ban is “not targeting Syrians, but rather terrorists”. It seems to have 
been created to further Syria’s diplomatic message about the differenting between Syrians 
and terrorists. Given that Trump was never mentioned using the @ function, and some tweets 
were in Arabic, it is questionable whether Syria actually wanted to engage with Trump, but 
the fact remains that it did engage in diplomatic exchanges with him on Twitter and it did so 
by seemingly avoiding confrontation, although using provocative messages in later stages of 
interaction. 
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Figure 8. Network analysis of tweets posted by Trump in which he mentions another country and those posted 
by diplomatic entities from countries he mentions.  Note: The size of the nodes indicates the in-degree of users 
(i.e., the number of mentions received: the bigger the node, the higher the number of mentioned received). The 
arrows indicate the direction of the relation. The thickness of the lines indicates the frequency of the interaction 
between the nodes they connect (thicker the line connecting two nodes, the higher the number of interactions 
among them).    
 
 
Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Yemen, North Korea, and China fall in the 
“unfriendlies who do not converse” category. Their diplomats did not engage Trump on 
Twitter even though he mentioned them, all in negative light except for China. The 
diplomatic representatives in China, Yemen, Iraq, and North Korea had no official Twitter 
accounts.  The diplomatic representatives of Iran, Somalia, Sudan and Libya had Twitter 
accounts but did not engage Trump on Twitter.   
 
Analysis of Trump’s diplomatic language on Twitter 
A simple content analysis was conducted to gage the extent to which Trump’s language in his 
tweets accords with the traditional codes and conventions of diplomatic language. This 
analysis indicates that Trump’s language in tweets does not display most characteristics of 
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diplomatic language. It is, however, quite moderate in a sense that it is more often than not 
non-dramatic. In sum, this style of communication can be seen as disruptive of traditional 
diplomacy, as it does not conform to its established codes.  
 
 
Figure 9. Analysis of language used in Donald Trump’s diplomatic tweets. 
 
Trump tends to use courteous language only with leaders of America’s allies. He writes 
“Thank you” in a tweet to Turnbull, and “Welcome” to Trudeau and Netanyahu. There are no 
similar extensions of respect, i.e., use of polite phrases, found in tweets mentioning foreign 
countries, these being friendly or unfriendly.  
The positive and constructive language also seems to be reserved solely for leaders of 
allies. To illustrate, when writing about Turnbull, Trump uses words such as “civil” and 
“nice,” underscoring them with the adverb “very” which he uses often. Similarly, writing 
about Abe, Trump uses words such as “wonderful,” “good,” and “productive,” again 
underscoring them with adverbs such as very and great.  
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Except for mentioning Japan as being “very well represented,” Trump does not use 
positive and constructive language in tweets about any other country, both friendly and 
unfriendly alike. Particularly negative language is used in tweets about Iran and Mexico. 
Trump’s tweets on Iran carry negative characterizations such as “terror,” “terrible,” 
“collapse,” and “last legs.” Writing about Iran as “formally PUT ON NOTICE” and “Should 
have been thankful,” and the US as “giving” Iran a “life-line,” Trump positioned the US as 
superior to Iran. Such lexical choices as “should” and “giving,” as well as the phrase 
structures that were used, indicate that Trump gave himself the authority to judge other 
countries, which can easily cause offense in international relations. Similarly, other Middle 
Eastern countries were mentioned with reference to “refugees” and “breakdown,” again 
portraying them in a negative way.  
Mexico, a friendly country, is similarly portrayed in a negative and unconstructive 
manner. Trump tweeted about it using words such as “deficit,” “one-sided,” “lost,” 
“unwilling,” “badly needed,” “little help,” and “very weak,” casting the US as “taken 
advantage of” by Mexico. Given all the negative connotations of words used by Trump, his 
language does not help create a positive and constructive relationship between the two 
countries. Surprisingly perhaps, Trump tweeted about other friendly countries in a negative 
context as well. For example, he used words such as “illegal” and “dumb” when mentioning 
Australia; “terrorist,” “attacked,” “locked down,” and “on edge,” underscored by the adverb 
“again” when writing about France.  Similarly, in his tweet on immigration into Sweden he 
used the phrase “working out just beautifully. NOT!” By using this vocabulary and phrase 
structure Trump insinuates that these countries have persistent problems and are unsafe, and 
positions himself as an authority that can judge other countries and their policies, which does 
not accord with the positive and constructive language traditionally used in diplomatic 
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interactions. Finally, the case of Russia is interesting as Trump frequently mentioned it, but 
rarely wrote about the country itself, talking mainly about his relationships with Russia. 
However, Russia can still be seen as negatively portrayed as Trump’s tweets on it often 
carried words with negative connotations, such as “non-sense,” “illegally,” “cover up,” and 
“made up.”  
While the content analysis suggests that Trump’s language in his tweets is often 
moderate, he can still be seen as using emotional and dramatic language in almost every third 
tweet. Most frequently, this is observed through his use of capital letters, which are seen as a 
graphical representation of yelling. For example, Trump wrote that Crimea was “TAKEN by 
Russia,” emphasizing the word “taken,” which implies intentional and hostile takeover. 
Similarly, when writing about the US relationship with Mexico, Trump wrote that it “must 
change, NOW!” His tweets on Middle Eastern countries, France and Sweden had similar 
tone. This detracts from the balanced and moderate language usually used in diplomatic 
exchanges, and particularly those between friendly countries.  
Finally, Trump tended to not use ambiguous language, which is a characteristic of 
diplomatic communication. His language tended to not carry qualifiers that allow for 
flexibility in the meaning of the statement, as he was often direct and specific in his 
statements. For example, writing about Middle Eastern countries, Trump specified that “72% 
of refugees admitted into U.S. (2/3 -2/11) during COURT BREAKDOWN are from 7 
countries,” leaving little to interpretation, while also opening himself to criticism if any 
information is incorrect. Similarly, he strongly declared that “Crimea was TAKEN by 
Russia,” an unambiguous statement about his perception of Russia’s role in the Ukrainian 
conflict. He was similarly direct in stating: “I don't know Putin.” But then, Putin had tweeted 
that he had talked to Trump, mentioning him with the @ function. Hence, while Trump 
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unambiguously states he does not know Putin, Putin had already mentioned that the two have 
talked. This opens up space for challenging Trump's statement about not knowing Putin and 
opening questions about his truthfulness and transparency. 
 
Conclusions 
Our analysis shows that the ways in which Trump uses Twitter can be seen as quite disruptive 
to traditional diplomatic communication. His language does not accord with the codes and 
conventions of diplomatic language. While the codes and conventions of diplomatic language 
call for language that is courteous, constructive and positive, moderate, and ambiguous 
(Jönsson and Hall 2002, 2005; Nick 2001; Park and Lim 2014; Strauss et al. 2015), Trump’s 
language on Twitter is not polite, not constructive and positive, and not ambiguous, albeit it is 
mostly non-dramatic. His communication style on Twitter as president remains fairly similar 
to his communication style during the 2016 presidential elections (Gross and Johnson 2016; 
Lee and Lim 2017; Ahmadian et al. 2017; Ott 2017; Gabler 2016), as it continues to be 
characterised by negativity, grandiosity, and impulsiveness, all of which are not considered 
suitable characteristics for diplomatic language. Given that this kind of language is well 
suited for Twitter (Ott 2017), it opens the question whether Twitter is a suitable platform for 
conducting diplomacy, or whether diplomatic practices and codes should be adapted to better 
suit the digital environment in which diplomacy is nowadays conducted.   
While Trump posted negative comments on Twitter about a number of friendly and 
unfriendly countries, the only diplomatic entity that responded in a similar manner was 
Venezuelan. Both friendly and unfriendly countries that were criticized by Trump and 
decided to engage him on Twitter remained within constraints of the diplomatic codes and 
conventions. They did not use impolite, negative, and unconstructive language and remained 
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to an extent vague and ambiguous in their responses. This is in line with how global 
diplomatic counterparts reacted in some of the previous cases when the US diplomats were 
seen as transgressing diplomatic norms, such as during the period before the Iraq war. ‘Even 
countries that supported the invasion of Iraq (for example, the U.K., the East Europeans) 
manifested in their pronouncements a healthier respect for diplomatic civility than did the 
United States,” observed Wiseman (2005, 425). Here the US diplomats’ behavior, deemed by 
many to be disruptive of diplomatic relations, was not mirrored around the world, and the US 
diplomats shortly afterwards returned to the traditional codes of diplomatic behaviour 
(Wiseman 2005). Our analysis suggests that diplomatic counterparts around the world may be 
again making a stand against the dilution of the normative underpinning of diplomatic 
communication, although further research is needed for confirming this preliminary and 
tentative finding. What is clear, though, is that there is very little evidence that new 
conventions of diplomatic communication are in the making, given the consistency with 
which the diplomats have been following traditional diplomatic conventions.  
The extent to which diplomats and diplomatic services of countries Trump mentioned 
in his tweets engaged in interactions with him on Twitter varied greatly. Some quite actively 
engaged Trump, from both friendly and unfriendly countries. It is perhaps not surprising that 
the diplomats and services that were most active in engaging with Trump on Twitter were 
ones that are usually very active on Twitter, such as those from Mexico and Venezuela 
(Lüfkens 2017). Hence, it appears that diplomats and diplomatic services that are comfortable 
in using Twitter and have been using it strategically and purposefully in the past, do not 
hesitate to engage in diplomatic exchanges on Twitter, even if they are responding to an 
attack by a world leader.  
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However, it is important to note that the majority of diplomats and diplomatic services 
of countries Trump mentioned did not engage with him on Twitter. Friendly countries such as 
Australia, Sweden, and France did not provide any response to Trump’s attacks on Twitter.  
They either refused to interact about diplomatic matters on Twitter, or they decided not to act 
at all to what could be considered an unusual provocation by a leader of an ally state. Given 
that a lack of response in diplomacy is considered intentional and strategic (Jönsson and Hall 
2005; Pascual 2001), these provoked friendly countries might have been sending the message 
that Trump’s tweets are irrelevant and unworthy of responding to, or perhaps they wanted to 
send the message that diplomatic dialogue should not be conducted over Twitter. In either 
case, Trump did not find an interlocutor in diplomats of friendly countries he attacked on 
Twitter, except for Mexico which had been already using Twitter for political purposes 
consistently and extensively. Overall, Trump's diplomatic communication on Twitter seems 
quite unique and, in that sense, he could be seen as an outlier while other diplomats and 
diplomatic services around the world appear to continue to follow traditional conventions of 
diplomatic communication. Consequently, based on the sample examined in this study, there 
is no real evidence that new codes are being constructed for diplomatic communications on 
social media, at least for the time being.  
Although based on a large dataset (119,229 tweets), our study has the limitation of 
having been focused on a small subset of data (91 tweets); therefore, its results have to be 
considered preliminary and tentative, rather than definitive and generalizable. Nevertheless, 
we deem our small sample large enough for an exploratory qualitative research on a quite 
new and understudied topic. We believe we have made a contribution by bringing together a 
set of concepts and establishing a set of systematic and repeatable methodological procedures 
that could inform further research on diplomacy on Twitter. With regard to the specific case 
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of Trump, we envisage two kinds of big data research that could be developed in the future: a 
longitudinal and a cross-sectional one. The former could take into consideration Trump’s 
Twitter production over a longer period of time; this could be useful for validating (or 
invalidating) our findings on Trump’s diplomatic strategies on Twitter. The latter could 
consist of a comparison between Trump and other heads of government, in order to observe 
with more reliability if and to what extent Trump’s communications on Twitter deviate from 
those of other world leaders and whether there may be a new diplomatic code developing for 
diplomatic communications on social media. Finally, further research should also address the 
issue of Twitter diplomacy from the perspective of diplomats themselves, i.e. in order to fully 
understand why diplomatic entities engage on Twitter in particular ways, it is important to 
understand their views on the appropriate code for diplomatic communication on social 
media.  
 30 
 
References 
Ahmadian, S., Azarshahi, S., and D. L. Paulhus. 2017. Explaining Donald Trump via 
communication style: Grandiosity, informality, and dynamism. Personality and Individual 
Differences 107(1): 49–53. 
 
Apps, P. 2016. Commentary: Trump’s brave new world of Twitter diplomacy. Reuters, 
December 5, n.p. Retrieved on June 10, 2017 from www.reuters.com/article/us-apps-twitter-
commentary-idUSKBN13U2VX  
 
Baker-Jordan, S. 2017. None of the US papers put Theresa May's visit to the White House on 
their front page. It's time to face our insignificance. The Independent, January 28, n.p. 
Retrieved on July 27, 2017 from http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/theresa-may-trump-
visit-newspapers-american-press-insignificance-a7550686.html. 
 
Bastian, M., Heymann, S., and M. Jacomy. 2009. Gephi: An open source software for 
exploring and manipulating networks. In Proceedings of the Third International Conference 
on Weblogs and Social Media, 361-362. Palo Alto, CA: Association for the Advancement of 
Artificial Intelligence.  Retrieved on September 21, 2018 from: 
https://www.aaai.org/Library/ICWSM/icwsm09contents.php 
 
Berelson, B. 1952. Content analysis in communication research. New York: Free Press.  
 
Bjola, C., and M. Holmes. 2015. Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice. Oxford, UK: 
Routledge. 
 31 
 
Caliandro, A. 2018. Digital methods for ethnography: Analytical concepts for ethnographers 
exploring social media environments. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 47(5): 551-578. 
DOI: 10.1177/0891241617702960.     
 
Caliandro, A., and A. Gandini. 2017. Qualitative research in digital environments: A 
research toolkit. London: Routledge. 
 
Cassidy, J., and I. Manor. 2016. Crafting strategic MFA communication policies during times 
of political crisis: A note to MFA policy makers. Global Affairs 2(3): 331-343.  
 
Crockett, Z. 2016. What I learned analyzing 7 months of Donald Trump’s tweets. Vox.com, 
May 16, n.p.  Retrieved on June 10, 2017 from 
https://www.vox.com/2016/5/16/11603854/donald-trump-twitter  
 
Crowley, M., McCaskill, N., and L. Nelson. 2017. Trump picks up the phone, sets off 
diplomatic chaos. Politico.com, February 2, n.p. Retrieved on June 10, 2017, from 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-foreign-policy-rhetoric-iran-australia-mexico-
234531  
 
Cull, N. J. 2011. Wikileaks, public diplomacy 2.0 and the state of digital public diplomacy. 
Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 7(1): 1–8.  
 
Deacon, D. 2007. Researching communications: A practical guide to methods in media and 
cultural analysis. London: Hodder Arnold. 
 32 
 
 
Dejevsky, M. 2017. In defence of Donald Trump’s Twitter diplomacy. The Guardian, 
February 5, n.p. Retrieved on June 10, 2017, from 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/05/in?defence?of?twitter?diplomacy  
 
Enli, G. 2017. Twitter as arena for the authentic outsider: exploring the social media 
campaigns of Trump and Clinton in the 2016 US presidential election. European Journal of 
Communication 32(1): 50–61.  
 
Freedman, R.O. 2017. The Obama legacy in the Middle East and the Trump challenge. India 
Quarterly 73(2): 241-250. 
 
Gabler, N. 2016. Donald Trump, the emperor of social media. CommonDreams.org, April 30, 
n.p.. Retrieved on June 10, 2017, from 
https://www.commondreams.org/views/2016/04/30/donald-trump-emperor-social-media  
 
Gross, J. H., and K.T. Johnson. 2016. Twitter taunts and tirades: Negative campaigning in the 
age of Trump. Political Science and Politics 49(4): 748–754.  
 
Gruzd, A., Wellman, B., and Y. Takhteyev. 2011. Imagining Twitter as an imagined 
community. American Behavioral Scientist 55(10): 1294–1318. 
 
Hanneman, R.A., and M. Riddle. 2005. Introduction to social network methods. Riverside 
CA: University of California. 
 33 
 
 
Hocking, B., and J. Melissen. 2015. Diplomacy in the digital age. Clingendael, The 
Netherlands: Institute of International Relations.  
 
Huang, K. 2017. State media criticism of Trump’s “addiction to Twitter diplomacy” signals 
China’s frustration. South China Morning Post, January 4, n.p. Retrieved on June 10, 2017, 
from http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2059200/chinas-state-
media-slams-trump-conducting-twitter 
 
Jönsson, C., and M. Hall. 2005. Essence of diplomacy. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
 
Krippendorff, K. 2012. Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. London: Sage. 
 
Kogen, L. 2015. Not up for debate: U.S. news coverage of hunger in Africa. The 
International Communication Gazette 77(1): 3–23. 
Larsson, A. O., and H. Moe. 2012. Studying political microblogging: Twitter users in the 
2010 Swedish election campaign. New Media & Society 14(5): 729-747. 
 
Lee, J., and Y. Lim. 2016. Gendered campaign tweets: The cases of Hillary Clinton and 
Donald Trump. Public Relations Review 42(5): 849–855.  
 
 34 
 
Lewis, S.C., Zamith R., and A. Hermida. 2013. Content analysis in an era of big data: A 
hybrid approach to computational and manual methods. Journal of Broadcasting & 
Electronic Media 57(1): 34-52. 
 
Lincoln, Y.S., and E.G. Guba. 1985. Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
Lüfkens, M. 2016. Twiplomacy study 2016. Twiplomacy. Retrieved on June 10, 2017, from 
http://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2016/ 
 
Lüfkens, M. 2017. Twiplomacy Study 2017. Retrieved June 10, 2017 from 
http://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2017/ 
 
Marres, N. 2015. Why map issues? On controversy analysis as a digital method. Science, 
Technology & Human Values 40(5): 655–686. 
 
Merrill, J. B. 2015. How Donald Trump talks. New York Times, December 5, n.p. Retrieved 
on July 10, 2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/05/us/politics/donald-
trump-talk.html 
 
Nakamura, D., and A. Fifield. 2017. Trump targeted Japan during the campaign. Now its 
prime minister is embracing the new president. Washington Post, February 9, n.p. Retrieved 
on July 27, 2017 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-targeted-japan-
during-the-campaign-now-its-prime-minister-is-embracing-the-new-
 35 
 
president/2017/02/09/66656864-ee36-11e6-9973-
c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html?utm_term=.d57341dc727d.  
 
Nick, S. 2001. Use of language in diplomacy. In Language and diplomacy, eds. J. Kurbalija 
and H. Slavik, 39–47. Malta: University of Malta. 
 
Ott, B. L. 2017. The age of Twitter: Donald J. Trump and the politics of debasement. Critical 
Studies in Media Communication 34(1): 59–68.  
 
Park, S. J., and Y. Lim. 2014. Information networks and social media use in public 
diplomacy: a comparative analysis of South Korea and Japan. Asian Journal of 
Communication 24(1): 79–98.  
 
Pascual, E. 2001. Pragmatics in diplomatic exchanges. In Language and diplomacy, eds. J. 
Kurbalija and H. Slavik, 225–232. Malta: University of Malta. 
 
Poguntke, T. and P. Webb (eds.). 2005. The presidentialization of politics: A comparative 
study of modern democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Rana, K. S. 2001. Language, signalling and diplomacy. In Language and diplomacy, eds. J. 
Kurbalija and H. Slavik, 107–116. Malta: University of Malta. 
 
Rogers, R. 2013. Digital methods. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
 
 36 
 
Shafer, J. 2015. Donald Trump talks like a third-grader. Politico.com, August 13, 2015. 
Retrieved on June 10, 2017 from http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/donald-
trump-talks-like-a-third-grader-121340  
 
Sharp, P. 2001. Talking to Americans: problems of language and diplomacy. In Language 
and diplomacy, eds. J. Kurbalija and H. Slavik, 93–106. Malta: University of Malta. 
 
Smith, P., and A. Bell. 2007. Unravelling the web of discourse analysis. In Key issues and 
debates in media studies, ed. E. Devereu, 78-100. London: Sage.  
 
Smith, S. and C. McClean. 2017. US-Japan Relations: US-Japan Relations and the Trump 
Effect, Comparative Connections 18(3): 9-16.  
 
Smith, C.P. 1992. Motivation and personality: Handbook of thematic content analysis. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
   
Stein, J. (ed.). 2011. Diplomacy in the digital age. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. 
 
Strauss, N., Kruikemeier, S., Meulen, H. van der, and G. Noort. 2015. Digital diplomacy in 
GCC countries: Strategic communication of Western embassies on Twitter. Government 
Information Quarterly 32(4): 369–379.  
 
Tremonti, A. M. 2016. Diplomacy in the Trump era poses challenges for world leaders. 
Retrieved on June 10, 2017 from http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-
 37 
 
november-18-2016-1.3855509/diplomacy-in-the-trump-era-poses-challenge-to-world-
leaders-1.3855645  
 
Wilson, G.K. 2017. Brexit, Trump and the special relationship. The British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations 19(3): 543-557. 
 
Wong, S. S. 2016. Emotions and the communication of intentions in face-to-face diplomacy. 
European Journal of International Relations 22(1): 144–167.  
 
Wiseman, G. 2005. Pax Americana: Bumping Into diplomatic culture. International Studies 
Perspectives 6(4): 409-430. 
 
Zhong, X., and J. Lu. 2013. Public diplomacy meets social media: A study of the U.S. 
Embassy’s blogs and micro-blogs. Public Relations Review 39(5): 542–548.  
 
Yougov. 2017. America's friends and enemies. Retrieved on July 11, 2017 from 
https://today.yougov.com/news/2017/02/02/americas-friends-and-enemies/  
 
 
 38 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 See https://dev.Twitter.com/rest/public for further information, accessed on July 15, 2017.   
 
 
2 See https://dev.Twitter.com/rest/reference/get/statuses/user_timeline, accessed on July 15, 
2017. 
 
3 Mentioned leaders and analysed accounts: Benjamin Netanyahu (@IsraeliPM), Justin 
Trudeau (@JustinTrudeau), Abe Shinzo (@AbeShinzo), Vladimir Putin (@PutinRF_Eng), 
Malcolm Turnbull (@TurnbullMalcolm), Xi Jinping (no account). Mentioned countries and 
analysed accounts: Australia (@TurnbullMalcolm, @dfat, @JulieBishopMP), Canada 
(@JustinTrudeau, @Canada, @cafreeland), France (@French_Gov, @BCazeneuve, 
@fhollande, @francediplo_EN, @jeanmarcayault), Japan (@AbeShinzo, @JapanGov, 
@MofaJapan_en), Iran (@IranMFA, @HassanRouhani, @JZarif), Libya 
(@GovernmentLY), Mexico (@EPN, @PresidenciaMDX, @LVidegaray), Russia 
(@GovernmentRF, @mfa_russia, @PutinRF_Eng), Somalia (@MofaSomalia, 
@HEhassansheikh, @SomaliPM), Sudan (@Mofasudan), Sweden (@swedense, 
@SwedishPM, @margotwallstrom), Syria (@Presidency_Sy), Ukraine (@poroshenko, 
@Kabmin_UA_e, @PavloKlimkin), Venezuela (@gobenlineave, @NicolasMaduro, 
@DrodriguezVen), Vietnam (@MOFAVietNam, @FMPhamBinhMinh), North Korea (no 
accounts), Iraq (no accounts), Yemen (no accounts), China (no accounts).  
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4 In sampling diplomats and diplomatic services’ Twitter accounts, preference was given to 
accounts in English, but in several cases only accounts in native languages were available. 
Tweets in non-Latin languages were sourced manually (not through software). Tweets in 
non-English languages were first translated by software to identify tweets mentioning Trump, 
which were then translated by native speakers. 
